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Abstract: This study empirically attempts to resolve the trade-off of the potential of risk-based capital 
and risk-independent capital in predicting bank solvency when measured by bank’s z-score. To achieve 
the study’s objective, bank-level data of Nigerian deposit money banks listed on the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange related to seven different measures of capital adequacy and other bank-specific factors are 
obtained from their annual reports and account between 2012 and 2016. The results reveal the 
superiority of risk-independent capital in a majority of random-effects models of panel regression 
analysis. Specifically and in comparison, equity-to-assets ratio is found to be superior to other indicators 
of capital adequacy using each model’s adjusted R-square. When equity-to assets ratio is paired with 
each of other capital ratios, the results support the superiority of the model with equity-to- ssets and 
non-performing assets coverage ratios (which are both risk-independent capital measures) having 
higher adjusted R-square. Some significant results are also found for other bank-specific factors. These 
findings have policy implications on the regulation of banks in Nigeria most especially regarding co-
opting non-regulatory measures of capital into regulatory regime. The investors and depositors are also 
provided with alternative means of analysing bank’s financial condition to ensure their interests are not 
lost unaware because of the linkage of the z-score to bank’s default risk. 
Keywords: Bank’s Z-Score; Capital Adequacy; Charter Value Theory; Deposit Money Banks; Equity-
to-Assets Ratio. 
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1. Introduction 
There is no disagreement in the literature regarding the vital role being played by 
banks in virtually all economies (Bougatef & Mgadmi, 2016; Sarpong, Winful, & 
Owusu-Mensah, 2014; Sepehrdoust & Berjisian, 2013; Sayed & Sayed, 2013; Tan, 
2016). This singular rationale accounts for the need to keep their soundness, 
solvency and going-concern (Bougatef & Mgadmi, 2016; Jha & Hui, 2012) in order 
to entrench their effective performance and reliability (Ginevičius & Podviezko, 
2013) because of the intertwining of their stability with that of a financial system of 
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a country (Miletic, 2009). The linkage of the strength of banks with the stability of a 
financial system brings about the international convergence in the regulation of 
banks in the form of Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) otherwise 
known as Basel Accord (Santos, 2001). The centrepiece of global regulation of banks 
superintended by central banks and other supervisory authorities in various 
jurisdictions ever remains capital since the establishment of BCBS in 1974.  
Capital, in Basel’s standard, is applied in terms of its adequacy and the ability to act 
as a buffer in a difficult situation (Athanasoglou, Brissimis & Delis, 2008) as well as 
protect the depositors against the potential shocks of losses that may be incurred by 
banks (Salgotra & Wadhwa, 2015). As argued in the related literature, one of the 
reasons by which banking crisis can be triggered is the capital inadequacy (Adegbaju 
& Olokoyo, 2008). This suggests that the effect of capital has the capacity to 
permeate all activities connected with the continued existence, that is, profitability, 
soundness, solvency, stability and going-concern of a bank.  
The significance of capital can also be noted in the injection more funds into the 
shareholders’ funds of banks whose capital base are found to be inadequate as done 
in Nigeria by the apex bank in 2009 (Ikpefan, 2013). Despite all-important role being 
played by the capital in the determination of banks’ financial condition, scholars 
seldom agree on its superior measure most especially in the prediction of bank failure 
and/or performance.1 Although there are several measures or indicators of bank 
capital adequacy (Klomp & De Haan, 2012; Schütz, 2014), they can basically be 
identified in two categories, that is, risk-based capital-RBC and risk-independent 
capital-RIC (Hogan, 2015; Mayes & Stremmel, 2014; Schütz, 2014; Smith, Grill & 
Lang, 2017; VanHoose, 2007). These indicators can also be categorised as 
“regulatory” and “non-regulatory” (Chernykh & Cole, 2015). The RBC and 
regulatory capitals are subjects of prudential regulation under Basel standards while 
RIC excluding leverage ratio introduced under Basel III in 2010 are purely non-
regulatory (Chernykh & Cole, 2015; Hogan, 2015; Schütz, 2014).  
Regarding the reality of the expectation of the influence of each measure of bank 
capital on bank financial condition, a number of studies place preference on the 
superiority of RIC (Chernykh & Cole, 2015; Hogan, 2015; Mayes & Stremmel, 
2014). Others empirically provide the superiority of RBC over RIC (Huang, 2005; 
Mathuva, 2009) while quite few studies reveal mixed findings (Schütz, 2014; Yang, 
2015). It has also been provided that the requirements for the computation of Basel’s 
capital ratios are enormous and full of mind-numbing complexities compared to non-
regulatory capitals (Chernykh & Cole, 2015). 
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This study is set out to examine the impact of each measure of bank capital on the 
solvency of deposit money banks (DMBs) in Nigeria. Although Central Bank of 
Nigeria (CBN) is statutorily empowered to manage ailing banks, the recent injection 
of funds in the form of convertible Tier 2 debt as a bail out to those banks whose 
capital base is grossly inadequate gives a wrong signal of Nigerian DMBs’ financial 
condition. Worse still, one of the DMBs classified as systematically important bank 
(SIB) is now under the management of CBN subsequent to its acquisition of an ailing 
bank under the management and control of CBN and Asset Management Corporation 
of Nigeria. Although a number of these capital ratios have been used to predict bank 
financial condition in the Nigerian context previously1, bank distress was the focus 
against the bank solvency being examined in this study. More so, only a few of these 
measures of capital were examined. Thus, this study is the first to examine the 
influence of bank capital adequacy, using a long list of its indicators (RBC and RIC), 
on bank solvency/stability in Nigeria. The findings of this study have the capacity to 
improve the financial consciousness of Nigerian investors and depositors as well as 
bring about some regulatory and policy overhaul in the prudential supervision of 
DMBs in Nigeria.  
Apart from Section 1 which provides a general background of what this study entails, 
the remaining part is structured as follows. Section 2 which is entitled “Literature 
Review” spells out the theoretical support for the study, reviews some basic concepts 
through which prior expectations are developed and reviews related previous 
empirical findings. Section 3 focuses on the collection and analysis of data while 
Section 4 presents and discusses the results of data analysis. Section 5 concludes the 
study and provides some policy implications based on the findings of the study.   
2. Literature Review 
This section reviews past studies relevant to the purpose of this study. Basically, 
bases are provided for the relevance of “charter value theory” to this study. It also 
reviews relevant concepts and provides prior expectations for the variables of the 
study as well as in-depth analysis of past empirical findings. 
2.1. Theoretical Evidence 
One of the theories that have been used to explain bank financial condition most 
especially in the areas of risk-taking, going-concern and solvency is the “charter 
value theory” (Demsetz, Staidenberg & Strahan, 1996; Ghosh, 2009; Keeley, 1990; 
Marcus, 1984; Marshall & Prescott, 2001; Martynova, Ratnovski & Vlahu, 2014). 
Although the relevance of charter value to bank financial condition was earlier 
demonstrated by Marcus (1984), the idea is often attributed to Keeley (1990) in a 
study testing the proposition that increased competitions cause bank charter values 
to decline, after which banks are made to increase default risk through increases in 
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asset risk and reductions in capital (Freixas & Ma, 2015). Charter value, otherwise 
known as “franchise value”, plays a strategic role of mitigating the problem of moral 
hazard peculiar to banking industry through increased bank’s incentive to operate 
safely (Demsetz et al., 1996). It is not a matter of contention among scholars that 
charter value is the present value of the future profits that an organization is expected 
to earn as a going concern (Demsetz et al., 1996; Ghosh, 2009; Keeley, 1990; 
Marshall & Prescott, 2001). From the bank’s stability viewpoint, it is the expected 
future value of the bank that is lost when the bank is unable to discharge its financial 
obligation (Marshall & Prescott, 2001). 
Although studies on bank financial condition often provide interlink of charter value 
with market discipline, depositor’s discipline, competition, deposit insurance and 
risk-taking (Demsetz et al., 1996; Ghosh, 2009a, 2009b; Marcus, 1984; Martynova, 
et al., 2014; Matutes & Vives, 2000), a number of others have established that a loss 
of charter value is synonymous to the loss of bank capital positions (Freixas & Ma, 
2015; Hellmann, Murdoch & Stiglitz, 1999; Marshall & Prescott, 2001). This 
confirms an argument that “a bank’s franchise value is the capitalised value of the 
bank’s future profits” (Hellmann et al., 1999, p. 3) and a mathematical expression 
that “the increased equity reduces the probability of default and the associated loss 
of charter (Marcus, 1984, p. 559). More evidence can be deduced from the findings 
of Keeley (1990) who concluded that “banks with more market power, as reflected 
in larger market-to-book asset ratios, hold more capital relative to assets (on a 
market-value basis) and they have a lower default risk” (p. 1198). The argument of 
Estrella et al. (2000) is that the bank failure is consequent upon the dissipation of 
charter value which is the value the owners can capture by selling their stakes 
represented by equity and other forms of capital when the bank is a going-concern. 
This shows that banks having higher charter value are expected to have lower 
leverage risk and lower default risk. By this, it is not an understatement to state that 
capital adequacy is basically non-monotonic in charter value (Marshall & Prescott, 
2001). Thus, bank solvency or default risk will not remain unchanged as the capital 
positions of a bank change. Although charter value theory does not recognise 
dichotomy of the measures of bank capital, it, however, lays emphasis on the ability 
of capital adequacy to reduce insolvency risk or improve bank solvency (Demsetz et 
al., 1996). This study is premised on this positive non-monotonic relationship 
between capital adequacy and bank solvency as evident in the literature (Demsetz et 
al., 1996; Keeley, 1990; Marshall & Prescott, 2001). 
2.2. Banking Solvency 
Banking solvency, stability and soundness are central to the banking regulation and 
supervision in any economy. In the light of this, scholars have devised several 
methods of measuring these key attributes of a well-managed bank (Demirgüç-Kunt 
& Detragiache, 2011). Although different measures are adopted in the past studies 
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(Demirgüç-Kunt & Detragiache, 2011), bank z-score remains a unified proxy 
adopted in the recent time (Adusei, 2015; Bourkhis & Nabi, 2013; Bustaman, 
Ekaputra, Husodo & Prijadi, 2017; Carretta, Farina, Fiordelisi, Schwizer, & Lopes, 
2015; Demirgüç-Kunt & Detragiache, 2011; Diaconu & Oanea, 2014; Elhadi & 
Madi, 2016; Hogan, 2015; Rahman, Zheng & Ashraf, 2015) because of its cross-
country relevance and indifference to subjective judgement of rating agencies’ 
analysts (Demirgüç-Kunt & Detragiache, 2011). It is evident that there are a number 
of variants of z-score: Altman model; ZETA®; and a simplified form of z-score 
(Diaconu & Oanea, 2014), the latter, adopted in this study, has been in use 
consistently for more than three decades to measure bank solvency, stability and risk 
(Boyd & Graham, 1986; Mercieca, Schaeck & Wolfe, 2007; Stiroh, 2004). 
Z-score, a measure of bank default risk, is considered as the return on assets ratio 
(ROA) plus the equity asset ratio (ETA) scaled by the standard deviation of return 
on assets ratio (Boyd & Graham, 1986; Demirgüç-Kunt & Detragiache, 2011; 
Rahman et al., 2015). Alternatively, using bank’s return normality, z-score connotes 
the number of standard deviations below the mean by which earnings would have to 
fall in order to deplete shareholders’ funds (Bourkhis & Nabi, 2013). “Z-score is an 
indicator of bank solvency that is inversely related to the bank’s probability of 
default” (Hogan, 2015, p. 34). It does not only indicate the distance of a bank from 
insolvency, its higher value symbolises that a bank is more stable (Ghosh, 2014; 
Stiroh, 2004). Z-score has two components: ROA scaled by standard deviation of 
ROA and ETA scaled by standard deviation of ROA (Barry, Lepetit & Tarazi, 2011; 
Köhler, 2015) indicating risk-adjusted ROA and risk-adjusted ETA respectively 
(Adusei, 2015). In agreement with previous studies, z-score is adopted as dependent 
variable.1 
2.3. Bank Capital Adequacy 
Capital adequacy is one of the components of CAMELS framework. CAMELS, a 
collection of bank-level accounting and financial data based on individual bank’s 
financial statements (Mayes & Stremmel, 2014; Schütz, 2014), represents capital 
adequacy, asset quality, management competence and expertise, earnings ability, 
liquidity and sensitivity to market risk (Jose, 1999). Having confirmed that the bank 
capital adequacy, based on the evidence from related literature, is measured in 
several ways (Chernykh & Cole, 2015; Schütz, 2014), this study addresses the trade-
offs between its basic variants: risk-based capital (RBC); and risk-independent 
capital (RIC). The RBC, which is purely of Basel standards, has two variants 
(Chernykh & Cole, 2015; Hogan, 2015) while RIC has a number of measures 
(Schütz, 2014), all non-regulatory except leverage ratio. The components of each 
basic form of capital adequacy are described below. 
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2.3.1. Risk-Based Capital (RBC)  
Risk-based capital (RBC), adopted to improve the identification of the risk inherent 
in a bank’s operations (Hogan, 2015), is a focal point in the world of banking 
regulation (Hogan, 2015). RBC relates capital as defined in Basel’s standards to the 
risk-weighted assets-RWA (Białas & Solek, 2010). Capital, in the Basel standards, 
comprises Tier 1 and Tier 2 capitals (Białas & Solek, 2010; Datey &Tiwari, 2014). 
Tier 1 capital is the bank core capital while Tier 2 capital consists of complimentary 
funds, that is, liabilities other than core capital like subordinated debts (Białas & 
Solek, 2010; CBN, 2015). The total sum of all bank asset categories multiplied by 
their designated risk weightings (Hogan, 2015) or the sum of credit RWA, market 
RWA and operational RWA (CBN, 2015) describe what RWA is all about. In the 
Basel standards, two RBC ratios are required as measures of capital adequacy: Tier 
1 capital to RWA called core capital ratio (T1CR); and addition of Tier 1 to Tier 2 
capital as a proportion of RWA (TCAR) also known as total regulatory or total risk-
based capital ratio (Białas & Solek, 2010; Chernykh & Cole, 2015; Bank for 
International Settlements- BIS, 2010). Both TCAR and T1CR are adopted as RBC 
ratios because they have been found to explain bank financial condition in previous 
studies (Hogan, 2015; Mathuva, 2009; Mayes & Stremmel, 2014; Schütz, 2014). 
2.3.2. Risk-Independent Capital (RIC) 
Risk-independent capital (RIC) also known as risk-neutral capital (RNC) or non-
risk- weighted capital is a measure of capital adequacy which does not incorporate 
the rigour of risk assessment and weightings required by regulatory body under Basel 
standards (Mayes & Stremmel, 2014). Some of the RIC ratios that have been adopted 
in the prediction of bank financial condition recently include: standard capital ratio 
of equity over total assets-ETA (Hogan, 2015); gross revenue ratio-GRR and 
leverage ratio-LVR (Estrella et al., 2000; Mayes & Stremmel, 2014); non-
performing assets coverage ratio-NPAR (Chernykh & Cole, 2015); and tangible 
common equity ratio-TER (Schütz, 2014).  
GRR is described as the ratio of core capital to gross revenue (Mayes & Stremmel, 
2014) where core capital connotes Tier 1 capital while gross revenue represents the 
addition of interest income and non-interest income before the deduction of expenses 
(Schütz, 2014). Although LVR is measured using several approaches (D’Hulster, 
2009; Yang, 2015), balance sheet approach which complies with the requirements 
of Basel Accords is adopted. LVR is measured as the ratio of Tier 1 capital to total 
assets less intangible assets (D’Hulster, 2009). TER is defined as the ratio of tangible 
common equity to total tangible assets (Schütz, 2014). Tangible common equity, 
described as a bank’s total equity minus intangible assets, goodwill, and preferred 
stock equity, allows a bank to absorb losses and yet keep running its daily business 
operations (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2013; Schütz, 2014) while tangible assets 
represent bank’s total assets minus goodwill and intangibles (Schütz, 2014). The last 
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RIC used in this study is the non-performing assets coverage ratio-NPAR. NPAR, 
defined as the “total equity capital plus loan loss reserves less non-performing assets, 
all divided by total assets” (Chernykh & Cole, 2015, p. 132) is a dependable tool in 
the prediction of bank’s financial condition because it has elements of two 
components of CAMELS framework-capital adequacy and asset quality (Chernykh 
& Cole, 2015). 
Based on the deductions from previous studies (see, for example, Chernykh & Cole, 
2015; Hogan, 2015; Mathuva, 2009; Mayes & Stremmel, 2014; Schütz, 2014), a 
positive influence of each measure of capital adequacy on Nigerian DMBs’ 
solvency/stability is expected.  
2.4. Other Components of CAMELS Framework as Control Variables 
The choice of control variables regarding the influence of the measures of capital 
adequacy on the bank’s financial condition is guided by the components of 
CAMELS frameworks being referred to as the bank-specific factors (Cole & White, 
2012; Mayes & Stremmel, 2014; Yang, 2015). Thus excluding measures of capital 
adequacy, AMELS (asset quality, management efficiency, earnings capacity, 
liquidity and sensitivity to market risk) indicators are adopted as basic control 
variables. Since there are several indicators for each component of AMELS (Klomp 
& De Haan, 2012) and past studies differed in their adoption of measures of each 
component (Mayes & Stremmel, 2014; Schütz, 2014; Yang, 2015), two indicators 
each are adopted for each component. 
To control for asset quality, the ratios of non-performing loans to gross loans 
(NPL/GL) and loan loss provision (impairment charges for loan losses in the income 
statement) to net interest revenue (LLP/NIR) are adopted because they are found to 
be more helpful and often used (Bourkhis & Nabi, 2013; Mayes & Stremmel, 2014). 
Although measuring management competence is somehow difficult (Mayes & 
Stremmel, 2014), past studies have found cost-to-income ratio-CIR (Bourkhis & 
Nabi, 2013; Klomp & De Haan, 2012; Mathuva, 2009; Schütz, 2014) and asset 
turnover ratio, that is, ratio of revenue to total asset- RTA (Abdelrahim, 2013) 
empirically useful. Hence, CIR and RTA are adopted as measures of management 
efficiency. The return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) which are often 
used as measures of profitability/earnings quality (Olson & Zoubi, 2011) are adopted 
in agreement with previous related studies (Mayes & Stremmel, 2014; Schütz, 2014; 
Yang, 2015). Also, the ratios of liquid assets to total assets (LTA) and liquid assets 
to deposit (LTD) are adopted to control for liquidity as evident in the previous studies 
(Mayes & Stremmel, 2014; Schütz, 2014). Sensitivity to market risk has several 
indicators because it is linked to the fluctuations in interest rate, foreign exchange 
rates and equity prices (Aspal & Nazneen, 2014; Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation- FDIC, 2015). Consequently, to control for sensitivity to market risk, 
two of its measures- ratio total interest expenses to total deposit (MKR1) and interest 
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gap ratio (MKR2) which are empirically proven (Aspal & Nazneen, 2014; Klomp & 
De Haan, 2012; Schütz, 2014) are adopted.  
Apart from measures of asset quality, sensitivity to market risk and CIR which higher 
values are expected to negatively influence bank’s solvency, other indicators of 
AMELS as used in this study are expected to have positive impact on Nigerian 
DMBs’ z-score and its components. 
2.5. Other Control Variables 
In line with previous studies, four additional control variables: bank size (SIZE); age 
(AGE); systematically important status (SIM); and the penalties for contravening 
related banks’ legal and institutional frameworks (PEN) related to bank financial 
condition are adopted. Following Athanasoglou et al. (2008), Mayes and Stremmel, 
(2014) and Smith et al. (2017) bank size is measured by natural logarithm of total 
assets while age since the commencement of operation of a bank measures bank age 
as adopted by Bahadori, Talebnia and Imani (2015). The systematically important 
status (SIM) of a bank is emphasised by the requirements of additional capital 
surcharge and net stable funding ratio among others for systematically important 
banks by Basel III (BIS, 2010; Datey & Tiwari, 2014). Furthermore, the statutory 
and institutional requirements for banks to comply with several frameworks and 
codes with sanctions for non-compliance lay emphasis on the supposedly influence 
of penalties paid by banks for contravening banking rule and regulations (Ezeoha, 
2011). Except for penalties for contravening related banks’ legal and institutional 
frameworks (PEN) which is expected to have negative relationship with bank’s 
solvency, the anticipated coefficient sign of others: SIZE; AGE; and SIM is positive. 
2.6. Previous Empirical Studies 
It is evident that z-score as a measure of bank financial condition is used in different 
forms, that is, as an indicator of risk, stability, soundness, solvency and probability 
of default risk (Adusei, 2015; Bustaman et al., 2017; Demirgüç-Kunt & Detragiache, 
2011; Ghosh, 2014; Hogan, 2015; Mercieca et al., 2007; Valahzaghard & Jabbari, 
2013). Also, capital ratios are used to predict different forms of bank financial 
condition (Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2013; Hogan, 2015; Huang, 2005; Mathuva, 2009; 
Yang, 2015) and a few empirical studies have the same combination of dependent 
and independent variables as adopted in this study. Based on this rationale, previous 
studies using individually or collectively variables adopted in this study are 
reviewed.  
Starting with studies reporting the superiority of risk-based capital (RBC) ratios over 
risk-independent capital (RIC) ratios in predicting bank financial condition, Huang 
(2005), using implied asset risk as a measure of risk, found the significant predictive 
power of Basel I capital ratio (RBC) and total equity to asset (ETA) ratio. In 
comparison, it was found that RBC ratios provided greater information than 
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traditional ETA ratio in predicting risk based on bank-level data of Taiwan 
commercial and other banks between 1998 and 2002. Though, bank financial 
condition was measured with return on asset (ROA) and return on equity (ROE), 
Mathuva (2009) was able to find the superiority of RBC ratios by providing 
empirical support for the positive relationship between Tier 1 capital ratio (an RBC) 
and the profitability of commercial banks in Kenya when ETA significantly and 
negatively influenced their financial performance. 
For studies with superiority of RIC over RBC, Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2013) provided 
series of empirical evidence with emphasis on superiority of leverage ratio in 
explaining stock returns- a measure of bank financial condition using a multi-country 
panel of banks. Specifically, Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2013) established a stronger 
relationship between capital and stock returns when capital was measured by 
leverage ratio rather than Tier 1 capital ratio. Another study that examined the 
determinants of distance-to-default using 94 US and European Union-EU 
internationally active commercial banks and broker dealers, Blundell-Wignall and 
Roulet (2013), equally found empirical support for the explanatory potential of 
leverage ratio compared to Tier 1 capital ratio using both univariate and multivariate 
regression analyses. When separate multivariate regressions were run for all sampled 
banks, global systemically important financial institutions (G-SIFI), and other large 
banks, the leverage ratio also outmatched the core capital ratio. When core capital 
ratio significantly explained the distance-to-default, it was against the prior 
expectation. Blundell-Wignall and Roulet (2013) also provided the relevance of 
predictive ability of SIZE among others. Also, Mayes and Stremmel (2014), using 
quarterly and publicly available data of 16,188 Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation-insured banks of United States of America between 1992 and 2012, 
found the significant predictive power of leverage ratio, total regulatory capital ratio 
and gross revenue ratio of bank distress and failure but with a clause of higher 
predictive accuracy of leverage ratio in a logit model. The study also provided for 
the relevance of AMELS indicators in predicting bank distress as well. Further 
evidence on the leverage ratio most especially based on Basel III was provided by 
Dermine (2015) who developed model that confirmed the superiority of Basel III 
leverage ratio- a RIC over Basel II/III risk-based capital ratios in predicting the 
probability of bank runs.  
Another important study in this direction is the study of Hogan (2015) who found 
that equity to capital ratio was a better predictor of bank financial condition than the 
total regulatory capital ratio for US bank holding companies between 1999 and 2010. 
This was after it has been established that both are statistically significant predictors 
of stock returns and z-scores using 3-stage least squares regressions and OLS 
regressions with firm-fixed effects. In an attempt to determine best capital ratio to 
trigger prompt corrective action, Chernykh and Cole (2015) examined a number of 
RBC and RIC ratios of US commercial banks between 2007 and 2012. It was found 
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that all the regulatory capital ratios: leverage; core capital; total risk-based; and 
tangible equity are all good predictors of bank distress but when compared with 
another ratio called “non-performing assets coverage ratio (NPAR), NPAR 
outperformed other commonly used ratios as enunciated using their pseudo R-
squares and receiver-operating-characteristics (ROC) curves in univariate logistic 
regressions. Chernykh and Cole (2015) further evidence revealed that NPAR 
outperformed the core and total risk-based capital ratios in discriminating failed and 
survived banks among the well-capitalised banks. By these results, it evident that 
NPAR does not only perform better than RBC ratios, its superiority over other RIC 
ratios- leverage and tangible equity cannot be ignored.  
There are also a number of studies that provided mixed results of the superiority of 
the two basic capital ratios. In a study examining the predictability of bank failure 
through capital ratios, Estrella et al. (2000) provided separate superiority for RBC 
ratio of core capital and RIC ratio of leverage and gross revenue using the time 
horizon of the prediction in logit models. As provided by Estrella et al. (2000) 
leverage ratio outperformed others in separate models while gross revenue ratio 
performed better than others in a model including all the three variables at one-year 
horizon but at two-year horizon the superiority of core capital ratio was evident using 
pseudo R-square and concordance ratio. In Nigeria, Okezie (2011) cannot 
empirically distinguish among three capital ratios of leverage, gross revenue and 
core capital as all are found to be equally efficient in the prediction of bank distress 
based on bank distress data between 1991 and 2004. For Schütz (2014), using a 
sample of the largest 100 EU banks and 100 US banks, there is evidence of 
significant predictive power of both RBC and RIC ratios one year and two years 
prior to the occurrence of bank distress in both banking jurisdictions. Another US’s 
evidence was provided by Yang (2015) that leverage ratio was superior in the 
prediction of failure of large banks while small banks distress was equally explained 
by Tier 1 capital, leverage and supplementary leverage ratios. 
A number of other studies most especially those with z-scores as their dependent 
variable and a few of explanatory variables as adopted in this study are also 
considered for empirical reviews. To start with, in a study examining the link 
between diversification and risk-adjusted performance for small community banks 
in US, Stiroh (2004) empirically showed that capital ratio of equity-to-asset and 
SIZE have significant positive impact on z-scores and risk-adjusted ROA of these 
banks. A study for small European banks by Mercieca et al. (2007) which followed 
Stiroh’s (2004) approach had similar findings regarding equity-to-assets and SIZE. 
For Ghosh (2014), while ROA positively explained z-score, SIZE has significant 
negative influence on it based on bank-level dataset of Gulf Cooperation Countries 
between 1996 and 2011. Further evidence provided by Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache (2011) revealed that there is no positive relationship between Basel Core 
Principles Compliance index and bank soundness measured by bank z-score using 
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bank-level data of more than 3000 banks in 86 countries. For Iranian banking, 
Valahzaghard and Jabbari (2013) empirically demonstrated that ETA- a measure 
capital adequacy has significant positive impact on z-score while AMELS indicators 
negatively influence it except profitability indicator. It has also been empirically 
shown by Adusei (2015) that SIZE and ROE have significant positive influence on 
bank stability measured by z-score and its two components with fixed-effects model 
of panel regression using bank-level data of 112 rural banks in Ghana between 2009 
and 2013. Another empirical finding by Elhadi and Madi (2016), while comparing 
determinants of stability (measured by z-score) of United Kingdom-UK building 
societies and public limited liability banks, showed that cost-to-income ratio and 
SIZE have significant negative influence on financial stability of both institutions 
before and during Global Financial Crisis. While testing the effect of interest margin, 
market power and diversification strategy on bank stability, Bustaman et al. (2017) 
provided evidence of significant negative and positive influence of SIZE and cost-
to-income ratio on bank z-score respectively while no significant relationship was 
established between measures of liquidity and asset quality and the z-score used to 
measure bank stability.  
3. Research Methods 
Bank solvency/stability is often measured by z-score and made a function of a 
number of bank-specific variables in the previous studies (Adusei, 2015; Bustaman 
et al., 2017; Elhadi & Madi, 2016; Hogan, 2015). In order to achieve the objective 
of this study, approaches similar to ones adopted in the previous studies are used. Z-
score, a measure of bank solvency and the dependent variable of this study is defined 
mathematically as: 
𝑍 − 𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 =  
𝐸𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡+𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡
𝜎𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝜌
 ----------------------------------------------------------- (1) 
Where: ί stands for each bank; t = each year of the sample period; 𝜌 = the whole 
sample period 
Having defined bank financial condition as a function of a number of bank-specific 
factors, Hogan’s (2015) model is adopted with some elements of the models of 
Adusei (2015), Bustaman et al. (2017), Schütz (2014), and Yang (2015). Hence, the 
following model is derived from the variables of the study using the z-score as the 
dependent variable: 
𝑍 − 𝑆𝐶𝑂𝑅𝐸𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2(𝐴𝑀𝐸𝐿𝑆)𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝑂𝐶𝑉)𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 -------------- (2) 
In the equation 2, CAR stands for capital adequacy ratio- a general indicator of all 7 
capital ratios identified in this study, since all the capital ratios are substitutes, each 
is used at a point in time in a model. AMELS is a vector of components of CAMELS 
framework other than capital and each is measured with 2 indicators. OCV is matrix 
of “other control variables” that is, SIZE, AGE, SIM and PEN adopted for this study. 
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Since CAR consists of 7 components that are close substitutes and each component 
of AMELS is measured with 2 indicators that are not used together in a model, 
equation 2 consists of 14 models in all. These variables which are 22 in all, dependent 
and explanatory, are described in Table 1.  
The data related to the variables of the study are obtained from the annual reports 
and account of all DMBs listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) between 
2012 and 2016, a period known for change in DMBs’ financial reporting system with 
the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs). With 15 DMBs 
out of 21 having their financial information in the public domain within the sample 
period, 75 bank-year observations are apparent but an unbalanced panel data of 72 
bank-year observations is eventually used for analysis due to missing financial 
information of a number of these DMBs.  
Data obtained from the financial statements of these DMBs are analysed 
descriptively and inferentially. Descriptive statistics include mean, standard 
deviation, maximum and minimum values while inferential statistics used are 
correlation and regression analyses. Correlation analysis seeks to know the level of 
relationship between the study’s variables in order to determine whether they are 
collinear. The regression analysis seeks to determine the extent of the predictability 
of DMBs’ solvency by each of capital ratios and other explanatory variables adopted. 
Since data are collected at time-series and cross-sectional levels, a choice is made 
between the random-effects and fixed effects models of panel data regression based 
on the results of hausman tests (HauM). The results of hausman tests and subsequent 
tests of Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (LMtest) upon the choice of random-
effects model following the hausman tests show that random-effects model is 
appropriate for all the models (see Tables 5a & 5b) except the model with ETA and 
second set of AMELS indicators (see Table 6a). Further tests performed and reported 
include Wald statistics (W-stat), F-statistics (F-stat), heteroscedasticity (Heter.) and 
variance inflation factor (VIF). VIF is performed to complement the results of 
correlation analysis in detecting the multi-collinearity among the explanatory 
variables but the overall VIF (mVIF) is reported. Based on the result of overall VIF 
(mVIF) for each model which is less than 10, multi-collinearity is not present 
(Gujarati & Porter, 2009) among the explanatory variables. For the presence of 
heteroscedasticity (Heter.), robust standard errors are added to the model. All the 
results of additional tests are reported in the Tables 5a, 5b, 6a and 6b alongside with 
the regression estimates. 
  
ACTA UNIVERSITATIS DANUBIUS                                                     Vol 14, no 6, 2018 
534 
Table 1. Definition of Study’s Variables 









Return on assets ratio (ROA) plus the 
equity to asset ratio (ETA) scaled by the 





Capital Ratio (TCAR) 
Independent 
Sum of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capitals scaled 
by risk-weighted assets 
+ 
3 
Core Capital Ratio 
(T1CR) 
Independent 




Equity to total Assets 
(ETA) 
Independent 




equity ratio (TER) 
Independent 




Leverage Ratio (LVR) 
Independent 




Gross Revenue Ratio 
(GRR) 
Independent 
Tier 1 capital scaled by the sum of 







Total equity capital plus loan loss 
reserves less non-performing assets, all 






Non-performing Loans to Gross Loans 
- 
10 
Impairment for Loan 
Losses in Profit or Loss 
account (LLP/NIR) 
Control The ratio of impairment for loan losses in 
income statement to Net Interest Income 
- 
11 
Cost to Income Ratio 
(CIR) 
Control 
Ratio of operating expenses to operating 
income 
- 
12 Asset Turnover (RTA) Control Ratio of Gross revenue to total asset + 
13 Return on Asset (ROA) Control Net income scaled by total assets + 
14 
Return on Equity 
(ROE) 
Control 






Total Liquid Assets scaled by Total 
Assets 
+ 
16 Liquidity (LTD) Control Liquid Assets to Total Deposits + 
17 Market Risk (MKR1) Control Total interest expenses to total deposit - 
18 
Interest Gap Ratio 
(MKR2) 
Control 
Difference between Rate-Sensitive 
Assets and Rate-Sensitive Liabilities 
scaled by earning assets  
- 
19 Banks' Size (SIZE) Control Natural Logarithm of Bank's Total Assets  + 
20 Bank's Age (AGE) Control 
Natural Logarithm of Bank's Age since 
Commencement of Operation 
+ 
21 
DMB's Systemic Status 
(SIM) 
Control 
‘1’ is assigned if a DMB is classified as 








Natural Logarithm of penalties paid for 
contravening banking regulation yearly 
by each bank 
- 
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Source: Author’s Compilation, 2017 based on deductions from related literature. Items 2-8 
are measures of capital adequacy jointly called “capital adequacy ratio” (CAR), AMELS 
indicators are items 9-18 while” other control variables” (OCV) are items 19-22. 
 
4. Results Presentation and Discussion 
This section focuses on the analysis and presentation of data as well as discussion of 
findings. Specifically, the results of descriptive, correlation and regression analyses 
are presented. 
4.1. Descriptive Analysis 
The descriptive statistics of all the variables are presented in the Table 2. 
Accordingly, z-score has a maximum value of 57.35 and mean score of 28.3. These 
are satisfactory but a negative minimum z-score is a source of concern for DMBs’ 
solvency/stability. It is also palpable that all the regulatory capital ratios including 
GRR and NPAR are adequate in terms of maximum and average values but negative 
minimum values provide the need for further investigation of Nigerian DMB’s 
stability. The closeness of minimum values of ETA and TER to zero is also not 
typical of banks that are satisfactorily solvent and stable. Other variables of interest 
include NPL/GL and CIR which are as high as 96% and 284% respectively. With an 
average of 1.6% and 5.4% for ROA and ROE respectively within the sample period, 
it is evident that DMBs’ profitability is at the low ebb. Other results are as depicted 
in Table 2. 
Table 2. Study’s Variables Description 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Z-SCORE 72 28.3052 14.7975 -1.3353 57.3488 
TCAR 72 0.1616 0.1142 -0.4698 0.3050 
T1CR 72 0.1366 0.1090 -0.4698 0.3030 
ETA 72 0.1389 0.0369 0.0050 0.2300 
TER 72 0.1309 0.0339 0.0005 0.1961 
LVR 72 0.0865 0.0877 -0.4779 0.1800 
GRR 72 0.7392 0.5805 -2.5896 1.5600 
NPAR 72 0.0795 0.1030 -0.5851 0.1726 
LLPNIR 72 0.1917 0.1785 0.0000 0.7266 
NPLGL 72 0.0761 0.1277 0.0171 0.9646 
CIR 72 0.7734 0.3057 0.3685 2.8400 
RTA 72 0.1234 0.0175 0.0918 0.1865 
ROA 72 0.0162 0.0150 -0.0560 0.0530 
ROE 72 0.0543 0.4948 -3.9400 0.2960 
LTA 72 0.3799 0.1243 0.0260 0.6134 
LTD 72 0.5560 0.1661 0.2211 0.9984 
MKR1 72 0.0526 0.0153 0.0236 0.0845 
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MKR2 72 0.1040 0.1438 -0.2411 0.4939 
SIZE 72 20.9503 0.6707 19.3196 22.1781 
AGE 72 3.4795 0.6885 1.7918 4.8040 
SIM 72 0.4028 0.4939 0.0000 1.0000 
PEN 72 10.0838 2.3290 0.0000 14.9037 
Source: Author’s computation, 2017 based on Stata 14 Outputs 
4.2. Correlation Analysis 
The correlation analysis is presented in two different correlation matrices depicted 
in Tables 3 and 4 for independent and other explanatory variables respectively. From 
Table 3, it is evident that most of these capital ratios are highly correlated with 
correlation co-efficient >0.80. This is a sign of multi-collinearity (Gujarati & Porter, 
2009). Conversely, since these capital ratios are not used together in a model, the 
effect of multi-collinearity has been mitigated. The high correlation between these 
capital ratios is also suggestive of their similar explanatory potential which can only 
be revealed by the regression results. Furthermore, there is no any evidence of multi-
collinearity among other explanatory variables as revealed in Table 4 because there 
is no any correlation co-efficient >0.80. 
Table 3. Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables 
VAR. TCAR T1CR ETA TER LVR GRR NPAR 
TCAR 1.0000       
T1CR 0.9692 1.0000      
ETA 0.1772 0.1874 1.0000     
TER 0.3426 0.3722 0.9485 1.0000    
LVR 0.9320 0.9606 0.1509 0.3238 1.0000   
GRR 0.9135 0.9514 0.1685 0.3459 0.9744 1.0000  
NPAR 0.8825 0.8926 0.0507 0.1996 0.9362 0.9134 1.0000 
Source: Author’s computation, 2017 based on Stata 14 Output 
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LLP/NIR 1.00              
NPL/GL 0.58 1..00             
CIR 0.50 0.3 1.00            
RTA 0.59 0.57 0.29 1.00           
ROA -0.49 -0.27 -0.71 -0.16 1.00          
ROE -0.27 -0.12 -0.49 -0.07 0.52 1.00         
LTA -0.22 -0.37 -0.41 -0.28 0.34 0.31 1.00        
LTD -0.12 -0.29 -0.3 -0.09 0.30 0.30 0.91 1.00       
MKR1 0.11 0.17 0.40 0.37 -0.48 -0.28 -0.28 -0.15 1.00      
MKR2 -0.01 -0.05 -0.25 0.03 0.34 0.32 0.18 0.18 -0.22 1.00     
SIZE -0.12 -0.31 -0.51 -0.48 0.49 0.38 0.51 0.44 -0.65 0.34 1..00    
AGE -0.01 0.03 0.05 -0.27 -0.09 -0.14 -0.11 -0.1 -0.17 -0.24 0.14 1.00   
SIM 0.05 -0.17 -0.3 -0.37 0.23 0.14 0.22 0.13 -0.58 0.17 0.72 0.08 1.00  
PEN 0.16 -0.02 0.05 -0.09 -0.16 -0.00 0.08 0.02 -0.01 0.03 0.25 0.19 0.18 1.00 
Source: Author’s computation, 2017 based on Stata 14 Outputs 
4.3. Regression Results 
The regression estimates are presented in the Tables 5a, 5b, 6a and 6b. In Tables 5a 
and 5b, 4 and 3 capital adequacy measures respectively, first set AMELS indicators 
and other control variables are regressed on bank’s z-score. The results, as evident 
in Tables 5a and 5b, show that only the models with equity-to-assets (ETA) and 
tangible-common-equity (TER) ratios which are RIC ratios significantly and 
positively predict DMBs’ solvency in Nigeria. Using their explanatory potential 
based on the results of adjusted R-square (Adj.R2), model with ETA outperforms 
others given the Adj.R2 of 73.38% compared to models with other capital ratios 
including TER with an Adj.R2 of 61.56%. The significant influence of AMELS 
indicators is also evident except that results of the measures of asset quality, 
management soundness and sensitivity to market risk are against their prior 
expectations.  
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Table 5a. Regression Estimates of Models 1-4 using First Set of AMELS Indicators 
with some capital measures 
Variable MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4 
TCAR 8.316(5.796) …………… …………… …………… 
T1CR ………….. 13.31(9.90) …………… …………… 
ETA …………… …………… 122.86(31.06)* …………… 
TER …………… …………… …………… 102.59(29.67)* 
LLP/NIR 5.995(2.00)* 7.09(2.48)* 1.31(2.52) 2.24(2.75) 
CIR 13.441(3.38)* 12.29(3.10)* 14.58(3.01)* 14.62(3.41)* 
ROA 460.25(101.51)* 438.37(92.12)* 325.88(76.19)* 350.57(94.12)* 
LTA 15.39( 7.35)** 13.56(8.00)*** 4.09(7.42) 5.58(8.84) 
MKR1 125.63(52.47)** 123.17( 51.35)** 25.25(42.84) 58.22(48.41) 
SIZE 2.09(3.31) 2.19( 3.16) 0.33(2.12) 1.17(1.98) 
AGE 1.90( 3.93) 1.76(3.79) 0.87(3.95) -0.81(3.62) 
SIM 0.68( 1.82) 0.55(1.70) 0.46(0.99) 0.64(1.23) 
PEN 0.17(0.24) 0.19(0.23) 0.12(0.14) 0.16(0.17) 
 _cons -56.98( 65.88) -57.29( 62.31) -19.76(42.04) -31.29(41.74) 
Adj.R2 0.4375 0.4594 0.7338 0.6156 
W.stat 338.33(0.000)* 663.23(0.000)* 239.80(0.000)* 207.82(0.000)* 
HauM 5.31(0.869) 7.24( 0.702) 8.07( 0.622) 4.99( 0.892) 
LMtest 81.62(0.000)* 82.77(0.000)* 79.94(0.000)* 84.06(0.000)* 
Heter. 1356(0.000)* 665.08(0.000)* 4158.69(0.000)* 12734.12(0.000)* 
mVIF 3.38 3.43 3.44 3.44 
Source: Author’s computation, 2017 based on Stata 14 Outputs. The regression co-
efficients and robust standard errors are reported with robust standard errors in 
parentheses. Wald Statistics (W.stat), Hausman tests (HauM), Test of Heteroscedasticity 
(Heter.) and Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (LMtest) report X2 with p-value in 
parentheses. mVIF indicates the overall variance inflation factor of each model, while *, 
**, and *** stand for significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.  
Table 5b. Regression Estimates of Models 5-7 using First Set of AMELS Indicators 
with some capital measures 
Variable MODEL 5 MODEL 6 MODEL 7 
LVR 7.46(8.45) …………… …………… 
GRR …………… 1.49(1.48) …………… 
NPAR …………… …………… 4.91(4.94) 
LLP/NIR 5.23(2.17)** 5.71(2.23)** 5.05(2.09)** 
CIR 13.78(3.55)* 13.75(3.49)* 13.85(3.82)* 
ROA 469.92(103.07)* 474.48(105.91)* 471.29(109.77)* 
LTA 15.78(7.63)** 15.13(7.79)*** 16.41(7.40)** 
MKR1 120.72(52.46)** 121.18(53.15)** 119.55(53.54)** 
SIZE 2.42(3.52) 2.15(3.56) 2.32(3.66) 
AGE 1.29(3.96) 1.42(3.93) 1.40(4.10) 
SIM 0.55(1.71) 0.63(1.76) 0.55(1.73) 
PEN 0.18(0.24) 0.19(0.25) 0.17(0.24) 
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 _cons -61.21(70.99) -56.58(70.77) -59.47(74.08 
Adj.R2 0.4199 0.4242 0.4168 
W.stat 297.77(0.000)* 313.80(0.000)* 188.76(0.000)* 
HauM 4.72( 0.909) 4.88( 0.899) 5.17( 0.880) 
LMtest 80.31(0.000)* 80.29(0.000)* 81.02(0.000)* 
Heter. 2334.11(0.000)* 2229.28(0.000)* 2808.78(0.000)* 
mVIF 3.36 3.52 3.36 
Source: Author’s computation, 2017 based on Stata 14 Outputs. The regression co-
efficients and robust standard errors are reported with robust standard errors in 
parentheses. Wald Statistics (W.stat), Hausman tests (HauM), Test of Heteroscedasticity 
(Heter.) and Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (LMtest) report X2 with p-value in 
parentheses. mVIF indicates the overall variance inflation factor of each model, while *, 
**, and *** stand for significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively . 
In Tables 6a and 6b where each measure of capital adequacy is modelled with the 
second set of AMELS indicators and other control variables, results show that all the 
adopted capital ratios positively and significantly predict the Nigerian DMBs’ 
solvency as hypothesised. This suggests that all the measures of capital adequacy 
whether RIC or RBC equally explain bank’s financial condition measured by bank’s 
z-score. Alternatively, in the model with leverage ratio (LVR), LVR appears superior 
to others given its significance at the least type 1 error, that is, p-value<0.01 but using 
the explanation of changes in bank’s solvency by the explanatory variables of each 
model, model with ETA as independent variable maintains its superiority with the 
highest Adj.R2 of 65.68% followed by the model with NPAR having the Adj.R2 of 
53.39%. The ratio of non-performing loans to gross loans (NPL/GL) also explains 
Nigerian DMBs’ z-score except that the results are according to the prior expectation 
in the models with ETA and TER. Other significant results are those of ROE with 
positive influence in the models with LVR and GRR and those of SIZE with positive 
impact in the models comprising core capital ratio (T1CR) and tangible common 
equity ratio (TER).  
Table 6a. Regression Estimates of Models 8-11 using Second Set of AMELS Indicators 
with some capital measures 
Variable MODEL 8 MODEL 9 MODEL 10 MODEL 11 
TCAR 27.87(14.40)*** …………… …………… …………… 
T1CR …………… 48.81(22.40)** …………… …………… 
ETA …………… …………… 128.22(51.62)** …………… 
TER …………… …………… …………… 124.16(49.47)** 
NPL/GL 15.37(8.45)*** 26.11(12.64)** -5.20(2.78)*** -6.38(2.92)** 
RTA 120.72(50.22)** 102.19(42.38)** 16.28(35.20) 22.1(39.25) 
ROE 0.72(1.19) n0.14(1.39) -0.91(1.47) -1.49(1.30) 
LTD 4.76(4.46) 0.74(4.27) 3.23(4.06) 2.89(4.85) 
MKR2 0.67(2.73) 0.21(2.90) 0.41(1.61) 1.11(1.81) 
SIZE 2.05(2.83) 3.61(2.11)*** -3.00(2.55) 2.92(1.65)*** 
AGE 0.16(4.19) 0.58(3.59) 6.18(7.71) -3.91(3.49) 
SIM -0.40(1.70) -0.43(1.28) -0.68(1.06) -1.08(1.23) 
PEN 0.098(0.19) 0.195(0.188) 0.15(0.17) 0.16(0.19) 
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 _cons -39.41(58.40) -72.85(46.74 47.27(39.23) -40.66(31.75) 
Adj.R2 0.4525 0.5222 0.6568 0.527 
W/F.stat 2154.18(0.000)* 1233.44(0.000)* 25.85(0.000)* 275.10(0.000)* 
HauM 7.62( 0.666) 2.14( 0.995) 86.51(0.000)* 5.65( 0.844) 
LMtest 87.79(0.000)* 92.08(0.000)* …………… 98.76(0.000)* 
Heter. 8512.34(0.000)* 905.91(0.000)* 1820.46(0.000)* 4570.27(0.000)* 
mVIF 3.34 3.48 2.02 2.02 
Source: Author’s computation, 2017 based on Stata 14 Outputs. The regression co-
efficients and robust standard errors are reported with robust standard errors in 
parentheses. Wald Statistics (W.stat), Hausman tests (HauM), Test of Heteroscedasticity 
(Heter.) and Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (LM) report X2 with p-value in 
parentheses while F-Statistics (F-stat) reports F-values with p-value in parentheses. mVIF 
indicates the overall variance inflation factor of each model, while *, **, and *** stand for 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Table 6b. Regression Estimates of Models 12-14 using Second Set of AMELS 
Indicators with some capital measures 
Variable MODEL 12 MODEL 13 MODEL 14 
LVR 57.82(21.53)* …………… …………… 
GRR …………… 6.018(2.897)** …………… 
NPAR …………… …………… 36.94(17.96)** 
NPL/GL 31.40(11.78)* 16.75(8.55)** 24.28(12.58)*** 
RTA 62.44(40.87) 115.06(56.04)** 95.38(52.13)*** 
ROE 1.41(0.69)** 1.674(0.691)** 2.157(0.573)* 
LTD 2.59(5.12) 3.48(4.93) 6.42(4.88) 
MKR2 -0.12(2.25) 0.832(2.79) 2.503(1.99) 
SIZE 0.089(2.3) 0.106(2.367) -1.98(2.63) 
AGE 0.075(4.13) 0.349(4.029) 1.145(4.753) 
SIM -0.45(1.49) -0.408(1.609) -0.314(1.599) 
PEN 0.224(0.216) 0.211(0.224) 0.110(0.186) 
 _cons 7.9(43.73) 0.750(43.76) 44.18(47.71) 
Adj.R2 0.4837 0.4506 0.5339 
W/F.stat 3333.65(0.000)* 1002.70(0.000)* 14688.96(0.000)* 
HauM 7.10( 0.716) 7.25( 0.702) 15.60(0.112) 
LMtest 90.76(0.000)* 85.79(0.000)* 82.78(0.000)* 
Heter. 3461.74(0.000)* 12563.86(0.000)* 22720.70(0.000)* 
mVIF 4.37 3.62 3.43 
Source: Author’s computation, 2017 based on Stata 14 Outputs. The regression co-
efficients and robust standard errors are reported with robust standard errors in 
parentheses. Wald Statistics (W.stat), Hausman tests (HauM), Test of Heteroscedasticity 
(Heter.) and Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (LM) report X2 with p-value in 
parentheses while F-Statistics (F-stat) reports F-values with p-value in parentheses. mVIF 
indicates the overall variance inflation factor of each model, while *, **, and *** stand for 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
Having established the superiority of equity-to-assets ratio (ETA) and that it only 
highly correlates with tangible-common-equity ratio (TER), each of other capital 
ratios other than TER is included in a model with ETA to further confirm the 
superiority of ETA. Based on the results depicted in Table 7, the superiority of ETA 
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is further established with its positive influence on z-score at 1% level of significance 
across all models. However, the two capital ratios that jointly predict bank’s 
solvency are ETA (a RIC) and T1CR (a RBC) on one hand and the ETA and NPAR 
(both RICs) on the other hand given their significant results but in contrast model 
with ETA and NPAR (both RICs) is superior considering the Adj.R2.  














































































ETA 114.44(13.65)* 113.15(13.55)* 115.74(13.49)* 116.18(13.72)* 116.59(13.38)* 
TCAR 5.01(3.69) …………… …………… …………… …………… 
T1CR …………… 7.39(4.06)*** …………… …………… …………… 
LVR …………… …………… 6.91(4.93) …………… …………… 
GRR …………… …………… …………… 0.948(0.841) …………… 
NPAR …………… …………… …………… …………… 7.161(3.904)*** 
_cons 11.58(3.68)* 11.55(3.61)* 11.61(3.65)* 11.44(3.61)* 11.52(3.54)* 
Adj.R2 0.599 0.6074 0.5992 0.5936 0.6081 
Source: Author’s computation, 2017 based on Stata 14 Outputs. The regression co-
efficients and robust standard errors are reported with robust standard errors in 
parentheses where *, **, and *** represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. 
The findings of this study are not in isolation as relatively similar results have been 
found in the past. Regarding the superiority of ETA on one hand and that of ETA 
and NPAR on the other hand, the findings of this study are in agreement with 
findings of Hogan (2015) and Chernykh and Cole (2015). On the concurrence of 
both RICs and RBCs in predicting bank’s financial condition as evident in Tables 6a 
and 6b as well as in Table 7 where both ETA and T1CR jointly and significantly 
predict DMBs’ financial condition as expected, the results accord to some extent 
with the findings of Estrella et al. (2000), Mayes and Stremmel (2014), Schütz 
(2014) and Yang (2015).  
 
5. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
The process of entrenching good financial condition of banks is never halted in any 
economy. This prompts the need to identify the measure of capital adequacy (from 
RBC and RIC) that best predicts bank’s solvency in Nigeria. The rationale for this is 
not far-fetched as the capital adequacy measured in several ways remains the 
centrepiece of bank regulation world over. The data for the study are obtained at 
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bank-level from the annual reports and account of 15 DMBs listed on the Nigerian 
Stock Exchange between 2012 and 2016. With the aid of random-effects model of 
panel regression of all study’s models except one, the findings reveal the superiority 
of equity-to-assets ratio. Specifically, the findings show that the predictive potential 
of any measure of capital adequacy regarding bank’s solvency depends on the nature 
of its co-explanatory variables in a model. This is evident in Tables 6a and 6b where 
all adopted measures of capital adequacy predict bank’s z-score as hypothesised 
regardless of whether they are risk-weighted or not. Nevertheless the superiority of 
equity-to-assets (ETA) ratio, tangible common equity ratio (TER), and non-
performing assets coverage ratio (NPAR) has been empirically established. A 
number of other variables of AMELS indicators and other control variables (OCV) 
are found to be significant but not without the reversal of a number of prior 
expectations. 
Based on these findings, it is concluded that risk-independent capital (RIC) is 
superior to the risk-based capital in explaining changes in bank’s solvency. It is also 
evident that, of the measures of RIC, the non-regulatory ones (ETA, TER and 
NPAR) outperform the regulatory capital. Of RBCs, core capital ratio (T1CR) is 
superior to total regulatory capital ratio (TCAR). For the explanatory potential of the 
measure of profitability, ROA is superior to ROE while liquid assets to total assets 
(LTA) is superior to liquid assets to deposit (LTD) for measure of liquidity. By these 
findings, there is sufficient evidence for bank regulators and supervisors, CBN, to 
consider incorporating non-regulatory RICs (ETA, TER and NPAR) into the bank’s 
regulatory regime. It is also expedient for CBN to investigate the reversal of prior 
expectations of measures of asset quality and management soundness as it is not 
economically defendable to conclude that the higher the non-performing loans and 
cost-to-income ratio the better the solvency of a bank. The investors and depositors 
are also expected to look inward while analysing the performance of banks using 
their capital adequacy and solvency. This is better achieved when several measures 
of capital adequacy and bank’s default risk are considered. Since there are several 
measures of capital adequacy (Schütz, 2014) even in excess of the number adopted 
in this study, future studies especially in the Nigerian context should consider a 
factor analysis of these measures (Klomp & De Haan, 2012) before their predictive 
power on bank’s solvency is tested. Also, a similar study of this nature can be 
replicated for the microfinance sub-sector of Nigerian banking sector.  
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